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I
Schelling used the word ‘construction’ to indicate an account
that located a phenomenon within the whole, and thus explained it
from the whole. 'This paper considers the place of nature within
Fichte's original system — as expounded in the 1794 Foundations of
the Whole Theory of Science and the 1795 Outline of the Distinctive
Character of the Theory of Science — and raises the question of the
explanatory function of nature within transcendental idealism. Nature
is deduced, or ‘constructed’ in Schelling's term, in section four of the
Foundations, the theoretical part of the Theory of Science. That
deduction furnishes us the concept of nature as necessary and
independent of us, but shows how it is permeated by lawfulness, which
is the work of mind.1 Nature is the object correlated with intelligence,
the I as dependent on (quantitatively determined by) the not-I.
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This discussion is not concerned with the problematic grounding
of first principles in the Foundations. Whether the third fundamental
principle is reached deductively by a priori reasoning or is an
explanatory hypothesis abstracted from the analysis of empirical
consciousness is of little importance to it, though this writer views
philosophical theories as heuristic structures whose standard is
coherence, not as foundationalist enterprises. The discussion is
situated intellectually in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, textually in
the difficult terrain of the Foundations' endlessly unraveling
arguments. As I understand Fichte's thoughts and second thoughts
about the matter, section four — the territory of quantitative
divisibility where I and not-I oppose and limit each other — falls into
two parts: first, an exhibition of the fluid nature of categorial thought
that points toward intuition as its real moment (Kant's “thinking
without intuition is empty”), secondly, the Deduction of
Representation, which moves from the twofold (reflective and
productive) interplay of the I's and not-I's activities in intuition toward
the fixity of thought, as if to illustrate the other side of Kant's saying,
»intuition without thinking is blind. “In the latter process, the whirl of
productive and reflective activities is first fixed — The intuitor
determines itself to the thinking of an object”2 — then understanding is
submitted to the determination of judgment, and finally to the
abstractive power of reason.
Fichte viewed the theoretical philosophy of the
Wissenschaftslehre's first presentation as murky to everyone but
himself,3 but felt the practical theory of science provided the
metaphysical foundation for the earlier treatment of cognition. The
Outline's reworking of theoretical theory of science makes that claim
clear in starting the construction of nature (or, what is the same, of
sensation or quality in matter) from the I's double striving to extend
itself to infinity and to reflect upon itself. If the wavering of
imagination produces the objectivity or ‘reality’ of sensation (the
intuition, where intuitor has disappeared into intuited), feeling or selfaffection, produced by the repeated setting and crossing of limits,
produces the sensor and its synthesizing activity.4 Intuition furnishes
only presence or a sense of reality derivative from limitation; sensory
and higher conscious acts are dynamic modifications of the psychic
forum provided by the interplay of action and limitation (striving,
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feeling, drive, inclination). It is on the psychic theater of registered
affections that the changing determinacies of inner and outer intuition
are displayed. Fichte claims the metaphysics of the Theory of Science
is found in the practical part. There is no object without a subject; in
every conscious or merely soulish act, something in or of the I acts on
something independent of, but for, it.5
We must briefly consider the systematic integrity of the Theory
of Science and its synthetic-analytic method. It is the tension between
the absolute positing of the I in the first principle and the synthetic
positing of the divisible I and the divisible not-I in the third that moves
the argument and its regressive analysis of that synthesis.6 Since
argument and analysis never finally resolve the postulated original
synthesis, never cut the knot but remove it to infinity,7 the logicalsystematic project of showing that the synthesis is grounded in the
thetic positing of the absolute I is never accomplished, but pushed off
into the receding infinity of the ought where the reconciliation is
proclaimed by a philosophic fiat.8 What is the status of the opposite
factors that appear at each stage of the progressive analysis? They are
intermediate links, synthetic points which accumulate between the
ultimate extremes, which are themselves untouched and in need of
further unification.9 If we understand synthesis as the productive
activity that oscillates between extremes and in touching upon them,
brings the neither/nor of their opposition into a both/and of their
reunion — this wavering is imagination, and its product is intuition, the
logical substrate of activity-become-world10 — then what its
progressive dissolution into opposites and sub-synthesis does (first for
the philosopher, then for the reflecting self) is to generate a series of
points interposed between the infinitely removed pure I and pure notI. Though I and not-I directionally define the line of finite realities
(states of self and world), they are imperceptible, as infinitely apart as
they are infinitely opposed. Perceptible points, however, the products
of analysis and sub-synthesis, accumulate between them, generate a
thickness, produce as it were a perceptible line: the empirical world of
finite knowers and agents, and their objective setting.
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II.
Fichte is anything but clear on the argumentative structure of
the theoretical section of the Foundations; this is not surprising, given
the work's hasty writing and episodic publication. That the Deduction
of Representation is not only the culminating but the crucial stage is
attested by its repetition and amplification in section five of the
practical part.11 We shall return to this text in greater detail. The
Deduction's importance is shown also by the placement of a simplified
version of it at the head of the Outline's clarification of theoretical
philosophy, in the section titled Deduction of Intuition.12 The I's
original activity is there said to be checked and reflected, and
accounted not as the I's activity but as that of an alien something. A
second free activity wrenches the first activity and rebound (or ‘affect’)
free, examines, and reproduces or represents its contents, again not
as its own activity, but as an image of the not-I.13 This sketch of
image-formation furnishes the clue for the explanation of sensation
and of the vanishing of the sensor or subject into the sensed or object
in the very activity of appropriating the content. The epitome of
technical difficulty for Fichte's Theory of Science is to explain the
reality of the sensed in sensation, given its origin in the I's pure
activity.
If the importance of the Deduction of Representation is clear,
the function of the preceding one hundred pages of the Foundations is
very obscure. The general aim of the argument is to establish that, as
intelligence, the I is determined by the not-I, or that the activity of the
I establishes the interaction of the I and not-I in such a way that the
former appears to depend on the latter. Attempts to mediate the
apparent paradox of the dependence of an all-active I on a not-I,
whose reality is just a portion of its activity alienated, all fall into a
circle of contradiction. None of the categories of relation — interaction,
substantiality, or efficacy — resolve the contradiction.14 The
unthinkably complex determining and determinable self-relation is
finally seen to be the work of the imagination, described as a selfreproducing self-conflict of infinite (determining) and finite
(determinable) activities. The activity wavers between extremes it
cannot unite, and so temporizes the I.15 Or, in an alternate
explanation, in the attempt to think opposites together, mind wavers
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between the demand for synthesis and the impossibility of
accomplishing it, commutes between the extremes, and in its
movement imparts a thickness and opacity to the space between,
forming intuition or the spatial-temporal manifold.16 Fichte's project
here was evidently to interpose some basis for empirical reality
between the divisible I and its counterpart.
But how can what Kant called the sensible manifold be traced to
the activity of the I? Fichte's intent in the theoretical Theory of Science
is to rewrite the Critique of Pure Reason, specifically the
Transcendental Analytic, in order to eliminate any causality by the
thing-in-itself. Even the sensible manifold, the bare given of sensation,
must be accounted for from the side of the tion: pure intuition, the
synthesis of productive imagination, and the unity of apperception.17
The latter two, functioning together as synthesis, are the
understanding, the faculty of pure concepts.18 If the understanding's
work is viewed more as synthetic unification rather than as
determination by bare quality or quantity, the relational categories of
substance, efficacy and interaction play the key role in transforming
disparate sensations into perceptions. Their conceptual content is
inherence, consequence, and composition, and their temporal
interpretation is time as duration, succession, and simultaneous
existence.19 Kant supposed all of this transcendental machinery
worked upon the empirically given manifold of sensation, imposing
unity on multiplicity, form upon matter. Fichte does away with the
multiplicity of the given, and for the bare logical unity of apperception
substitutes the synthesis expressed in the third basic principle, where
the limited I is confronted by the limited not-I. He wishes to effect the
synthesis abstractly and a priori, as thought, and thus attempts to
think the synthesis by means of the pure concepts of substance,
efficacy, and community, viz., alteration, continuity of alteration, and
composition. The synthesis takes place not only at the level of abstract
thought, but also on the level of imagination. Kant defined imagination
as “the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not
present”20 and described its scope as the action of the understanding
upon sensibility in general. Transposing these hints to the framework
of genetic explanation, Fichte makes productive imagination ultimately
productive of intuition itself. Initially abstract cognitive synthesis
becomes sensuous presence, the empirical manifold into whose
Fichte-Studien, Vol 11 (October 1997): pg. 1-11. DOI. This article is © Philosophy Documentation Center and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Philosophy Documentation Center does not
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Philosophy Documentation Center.

5

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

sensory manifestation the I and its productive activity disappear. What
appears between I and not-I, on this side of the boundary between
them, is a field of activity and reflection that has become an altering,
continuous, composite something: the stuff of objectivity paradoxically
derived from the I's pure spontaneity.

III.
The true focus of this inquiry is the process in which nature or
objectivity emerges for the I, where the not-I is constituted as an
outside reality. Two crucial texts use metaphors of deficient perception
to suggest the paradox that pure activity gives rise to reality, not once
but at two different levels: On the one hand, activity appears in the
guise of the affect, sensation, or intuition that appears solely as
intuited; on the other, it imparts shadowy reality to the ground of
objectivity, the not-I, which exerts a force against the I that is in fact
imparted to it by the I. The Outline describes the first case, sensation
as the place where the I loses itself in its object, where activity shows
itself only as passivity. There its action is intuition, “a silent
unconscious contemplation that loses itself in its object.”21 In the
Foundations' Deduction of Representation, it is said the not-I is
realized and empowered to limit the self's reflection when a “dark,
unreflected intuition that does not reach determinate consciousness” is
projected beyond the initial boundary.22
We must furnish some account at this point of the difference
between activity and reflection. The origin of reflection is not a topic
for theoretical Theory of Science, whose exclusive concern is the
constitution of preconscious objectivity. Accordingly, the Outline treats
the topic simply, borrowing from the practical philosophy of the
Foundations the view that the I is impelled by a double striving, one a
tendency to fill infinity, the other to comprehend it or reflect on itself
as something infinite.23 Its first reflection is necessary, occasioned by
the limitation or check of its productive activity. It flows, however,
from the nature of the I: “The I reflects simply because it reflects.”24
The origin of reflection is a larger problem, however, for the
1794 Foundations, for the initial model of the doubling of productive
and reflective activities given in the Deduction of Representation freely
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avails itself of the check or arbitrary determinate limitation. Near the
end of the deduction of imagination in the constellation of theoretical
faculties, the check is introduced as a metaphor for the disappearing
objectivity of the finite factor in the conjunction-and-clash of infinite
and finite activities.25 The check is pictured as throwing back, or
reflecting, the I's outward-going activity; the only thing plainly
asserted of it is that it is not posited by the positing I, while its
possibility is determined by that activity.26 This is restated more clearly
in the practical philosophy's deduction of striving (§ 5) where Fichte
asserts that the condition for the possibility of an alien influence must
be grounded beforehand in the I. If difference can ever enter the I, it
must have been there originally, grounded in its activity?? All this is to
say, I believe, that if the I is ever limited by alien objectivity, this can
be understood a priori through the J's activity. It is a conceptual
possibility, though, not a necessity. That it happens, a finite I can
assure itself in experience.28 This is in apparent violation of the easy
symmetry between thinking and experience that Fichte asserts in the
Outline when he claims that whatever theory of science correctly
deduces will show up in experience, though it would be true were
there no experience at all.29
With the possibility of reflection established, we can now look to
those passages where the mystery of the not-I's reality (the “dark
unreflected intuition”) and of the sensation's objectivity (the “silent
unconscious intuition”, where the intuitor recedes into what is intuited)
are given the explanation of which they are capable. The I has a
general tendency to reflect, but it can never be conscious of itself as
spontaneity or activity; reflection is always compelled, i. e., it results
in consciousness of a product, never of an act.30 Consciousness will
never capture the spontaneous and self-reverting activity of the I, only
the activity that registers its being affected by some force from
without. The conscious I is conscious only of some state of itself, or,
more carefully, of some alteration in its state. A double objectivity is
interposed between the original activity of the I and the state of
consciousness called perception, where the I identifies itself with its
affect and knows itself as dependent on an external something.
We can now look to the Deduction of Representation itself,31
confessing it would be unintelligible without its repetition in the
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practical philosophy32 and again in the beginning of the Outline.33 [1]
Fichte begins the deduction with an account of how the infinite
outreaching activity of the I becomes a real something, an intuition.
This intuition is the outcome of imagination: activity wavering between
extremes it cannot unite. In it activity is formed into product,
subjectivity transformed into objectivity. The I active in intuition can
never become conscious of its activity as intuitor. Fichte conveys this
situation very abstractly by positing (a) the outward-reaching activity,
(b) its check and deflection back toward the self at some arbitrary
point, and (c) a conflict or alternation between the two activities,
outgoing and incoming. The alternation temporizes and gives
extension to the area between the I and its imagined boundary. This is
the first circuit of energy or productive activity.34 Since Fichte later
calls this productive activity centrifugal activity, it is reasonable to
suppose that he has in mind Kant's dynamic construction of matter in
the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. The first circuit (activity-check-reflection) as a whole models Kant's repulsive or resistant
force, which, though it works outward, is compressed at a point.35 The
product of Fichte's deduction to this point may be visualized as a
point-instant.
A second circuit of activity-and-reflection is generated by the
continuing activity of the I, this time in a reflective, not a productive
mode. [2] What differentiates the productive from the reflective mode
is that the first circuit, a mere action-reaction or wavering in the
imagination, is stabilized and fixed by reason, i.e., permeated with the
rigidity of logical structures, rendered into a real something. Intuition
becomes a state of the I, capable of itself being intuited and
appropriated by the I as its affection.36 [3] This allows the I's activity
to go forth as active, distinct from this fixed product, and be reflected
again as its activity. In the second circuit of activity-and-reflection,
therefore, the intuitor emerges as intuiting its prior product; this is
sensation.
The second circuit is complicated, however. [3a] There is no
second check, but the second outward wave of activity, essentially
reflective since the productive aspect has been precipitated out, must
be limited in order to intuit the previous product. Its activity is turned
back again at the limit of its previous activity, i.e., the point of check
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and rebound. It is deflected this time because productive activity steps
beyond the previous limit, and by an unreflected act of imagination
posits another intuition on the other side of the boundary. This is the
»dark unreflected intuition« of our search, the felt reality of a limit that
is not internalized and does not become a something. The not-I or
nature is constructed, then, as the produced limit that acts (or reacts)
as a beyond because it is an unintuited (“dark unreflected”) intuition.37
[3b] The not-I, then, returns the second activity, and the wavering
product of outgoing and incoming activity on this second level
produces another intuition, the image or copy. This second cycle of
activity-and-reflection creates the first as a state of the intuiting I. The
second or reflective cycle of activity-and-return is later called
centripetal, on analogy with Kant's second dynamic force, the so-called
attractive force.38 [4] A third cycle, where productive activity flows
endlessly outward and is infinitely returned past the boundary and the
stabilized product, produces an intuition of the intuited; it is
unreflected, has but a directional and felt reality. This is the thing-initself or noumenon, the not-I in its ultimate capacity of distinguishing
the sensation felt as mine from the outside felt as beyond.39
In the course of this deduction, then, Fichte has (with some
difficulty) explained that (A) the I produces the intuition in
imagination, (B) stabilizes it as a reality in the understanding, (C)
makes the intuited-something into its state while distinguishing it from
something else which is not itself, and (D) makes this not-I (which is
nonetheless its product) the source and origin of its affection or state.
The whole complex is representation. The key task of distinguishing
the subject of representation from object represented falls to the
reality produced by the I, but unreflectedly projected outward as the
not-I, objectivity as such, or nature. No one, as Fichte rightly says,
can doubt that she experiences it or something like it on the empirical
level. It is incapable of further explanation on idealistic assumptions
than Fichte has given it. His explanation of it is judicious in that, on
the empirical level, our experience of it is precisely that of a felt limit
which is not me. The theoretical part of the Theory of Science gives it
just that minimal an ontological standing, though it must go through
many explanatory turns to achieve that minimality.
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IV.
When Fichte again deploys this scheme of the double circuit of
activity and reflection in the main section of the practical Theory of
Science, it is much simplified.40 The mysterious role of the check, the
dark intuition projected over the boundary, the third circuit of
noumenal influence that teaches the I to distinguish between sensation
and object, all drop from sight. The I is said, from the first, to be
productive and reflective, its self-reverting activity falling into
centripetal and centrifugal activities. This simplification is effected by
Fichte's borrowing from philosophy of nature notions that are really
given to it by transcendental philosophy: Assume, he says, that the I
is a self-constituting mathematical point; its activity will be inner force,
reflective, centripetal activity. But if that point is posited as an I, as
self-reflecting, its activity will be infinitely centrifuga1.41
On this simplified model, the centrifugal and centripetal
impulses of the I's activity, which issue from the demand that the I
infinitely extend itself and also infinitely reflect, become the bases for
the real series of presentations and the ideal series of projects. The
feeling of finitude or restriction occasioned by the check upon activity
both determines the I as intelligence and differentiates the activities of
the theoretical and practical faculties. Infinite practical striving (as in
the ever receding moral ideal) and cognition limited to knowledge of a
world of finite objects and agents are reciprocal conditions for one
another, the infinite and finite partial realizations of the I's absolute
se1f-positing.42 The crucial condition is the realization of the check, the
dark, unreflected intuition projected beyond as not-I. Only by the
doubled circuit of activity and reflection is the I in its self-activity made
open to external influence. Only because its positing takes this highly
complicated form of outgoing and return (rather than pure selfreversion) is its identity a state of reciprocity which leaves it open to
the incursion that will make its action into conscious life.43
Fichte's arguments and explanations often end up more
complicated than he intends, and it is usually fairly difficult to discern
the intent behind large stretches of argument. Perhaps history can
shed light where argument is opaque. It is clear, of course, that Fichte
wishes to put Kant's transcendental synthesis of the imagination at the
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center of both the theoretical and practical philosophies of the Theory
of Science. Its merely formal function in Kant's theory is surpassed;
what was there merely a function that related the fixed extremes of
sensibility and understanding becomes in Fichte's hand the dynamic
agent that evolves those extremes out of its evanescent activity.
Fichte also uses Kant's model of matter as a synthesis of dynamic
forces to finitize cognition in the Deduction of Representation and to
differentiate willing from cognition; Fichte's language is so abstract
that one tends to forget that his infinite striving nestles in a finite
body. Fichte is indebted to Spinoza on this score as well, for the grand
dogmatist located the boundless conatus in the affects, making the
self-aware component of consciousness derivative from and adjectival
upon sensation's registration of a change of state in the bodily
environment. Finally, one ought to acknowledge Fichte's debt to
Leibniz. The finite I whose cognition is based upon awareness of
change of state, and whose conscious endeavors all depend on striving
bears much resemblance to Leibniz's monad, the perception-machine
driven by appetition, upon whose self-activity is overlaid the
semblance of external influence.
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